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We provide a model of conﬂict and mass killing decisions to identify
the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to
occur. We predict that mass killings are most likely in countries with
large amounts of natural resource rents, polarization, institutional con-
straints regarding rent sharing, and low productivity of labor. The role
of resources such as oil, gas, and diamonds and other key determinants
of mass killings is conﬁrmed by our empirical results based on country-
level as well as ethnic group–level analysis.
I. Introduction
SinceWorld War II some 50 episodes of mass killings have led to between
12 and 25million civilian casualties ðPolitical Instability Task Force geno-
cide dataÞ and by 2008 have induced the displacement of 42 million
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people ðUNHigh Commissioner for Refugees 2009Þ.1 Surprisingly, while
there is an increasing number of formal models of civil and interstate
wars ðsurveyed by Blattman and Miguel ½2010 and Jackson and Morelli
½2011Þ, the issues of mass killings and forced displacements of civil-
ians have so far been largely neglected as far as formal rational expla-
nations are concerned. In this paper, we study whether decisions to en-
gage in mass killings can be explained as the result of strategic, rational
calculation.
The mass killing in Sudan’s Darfur region that started in 2003 illus-
trates the key features we wish to emphasize as most relevant for the
explanation of mass killing incentives. The ﬁrst feature is a set of distinct,
identiﬁable groups. The primary perpetrators of the killings and ex-
pulsions in Darfur were government-backed “Arab” militias. The main
civilian victims were black “Africans” ðStraus 2005Þ. The second feature is
a large amount of resource wealth relative to nonresource productivity.
The early twenty-ﬁrst century was characterized by natural resource
shocks ðSudan becomes an increasingly important oil producerÞ. At the
same time, productivity and state capacity of Sudan remained very low.
The estimates of the death toll vary between 70,000 and 400,000 fatali-
ties, with an estimated 1.8 million people displaced ðStraus 2005, 2006;
Waal 2007Þ. This corresponds to a signiﬁcant fraction of the total pop-
ulation in this region, which was about 6.5 million before the outbreak
of the crisis. The killings were clearly strategic, “directed by the state,
targeted at a particular ethnic population, and intended to destroy that
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1 We adopt the deﬁnition in Charny ð1999, 7Þ and Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat ð2006, 132Þ:
“Mass killings are the killings of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the
course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under the con-
ditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims.” The estimates of
how many civilian fatalities have fallen in this category vary a lot because of the difﬁcul-
ties in identifying degrees of intentionality and targeting, but they are substantial by any
standard. In contrast with the estimate by the Political Instability Task Force, Bae and Ott
ð2008Þ use even larger numbers: The conﬂict-related deaths in the twentieth century were
as large as 109.7 million, corresponding to 4.35 percent of the world population. Of these,
60 percent were civilian noncombatants. Websites for all the databases discussed in this
article are presented in App. B.
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ethnic population in substantial part” ðStraus 2006, 43Þ. Reducing the
population size of the opponent group by extermination allows the per-
petrator to obtain a larger share in the future distribution of surplus. This
incentive is particularly relevant within countries with well-deﬁned eth-
nic groups and where the government is basically controlled by one of
them.
In line with the above anecdotal intuition about the key potential
drivers of mass killing incentives, we introduce a formal model with the
following characteristics: the population is divided into two identiﬁable
groups, and one of them initially controls the government; in every
period of the game the two groups decide whether to go to war with each
other or not, and peace prevails if and only if both groups choose to
maintain peace; whoever is in power at the end of a period decides uni-
laterally the distribution of the surplus of that period’s production as well
as whether or not to commit mass killings. We analyze ﬁrst an unlimited
power benchmark, in which the only limits to exploitation and elimina-
tion of opponents are endogenous. We then generalize the analysis to
include the possibility of exogenous bounds to the exercise of power,
such as a minimum share of resources that must be given to any group,
or limits on the ability to kill.
We characterize the best ðtotal-surplus-maximizingÞ subgame perfect
equilibriumof the inﬁnite horizongamebetween the twogroups.Weﬁnd
that the likelihood of mass killings is increasing in natural resource
abundance and decreasing in labor productivity and destruction costs of
war.Moreover, we ﬁnd that group polarization increases the likelihood of
mass killings, whereas an increase in population size ðkeeping polariza-
tionconstantÞ reduces theprobability of suchevents. Finally,weﬁnd that a
tightening of institutional constraints to distributive power increases the
probability of mass killings whenever the constraint binds, while a tight-
ening of the constraints on the power to kill has ambiguous effects and
can in some situations—maybe paradoxically—fuel killing incentives.
Themain trade-off for a group holding power is as follows. The elimina-
tion of minority members in the present reduces the future constraints on
surplus sharing but on the other hand reduces future production in labor-
intensive sectors; hence the trade-off is intuitively affected by the relative
preponderance of natural resources.
Starting from a situation in which the institutional constraints to un-
fairness in surplus sharing are limited ðe.g., starting from an effective
dictatorshipÞ, an increase in the institutional lower bound to unfairness
ðe.g., caused by greater checks and balances typical of a democratization
processÞ can have ambiguous effects on violence: on the one hand, an
exogenous increase in institutional constraints to unfairness obviously
reduces themotivations to rebel; on the other hand, such a change in the
institutional constraints makes it harder to expropriate a group when it is
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out of power and therefore more attractive to eliminate the group en-
tirely through mass killings.
Inspired by our theoretical model and by its predictions, we present a
novel empirical analysis of mass killings, studying the effects of natural
resource rents and all the other key variables of the theory, at the country
and ethnic group levels. As suggested by the theory, our empirical anal-
ysis conﬁrms that natural resource rents are a robust and very signiﬁcant
predictor of mass killings, while a high labor productivity is found to
discourage massacres. Mass killings are also signiﬁcantly more likely af-
ter recent democratization and in small, ethnically polarized countries.
Further, we ﬁnd that—when controlling for the country characteristics—
ethnic groups are signiﬁcantly more likely to be massacred if they are
relatively small and resource rich, which is in line with our theory. In
contrast, these ﬁndings are not easy to reconcile with alternative mech-
anisms suggesting, for example, that oil may fuel mass killings by making
oil-rich groups more powerful. If this alternative explanation were driv-
ing the correlation between oil and mass killings, we should expect oil-
poor groups to be the main targets, which contradicts our empirical
results.
This paper contributes to several strands of the existing literature.
There is a theoretical literature on slavery and forced labor ðsee, e.g.,
Domar 1970; Lagerlo¨f 2009; Acemoglu andWolitzky 2011Þ, although the
dynamic incentives are very different from the ones for mass killings. The
literature on battle-related, two-sided violence in civil wars is also com-
plementary to our work ðe.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas
2007Þ. Powell’s ð1996Þ “declining state” explanation for war is relevant
as well, although in our model the minority group’s expected future
weakening depends directly on actions that the group in power will take
if power remains in their hands.
For previous empirical work on mass killings, see Rummel ð1994,
1995Þ, Krain ð1997Þ, Scully ð1997Þ, Harff ð2003Þ, Valentino, Huth, and
Balch-Lindsay ð2004Þ, Besanc¸on ð2005Þ, Easterly et al. ð2006Þ, Eck and
Hultman ð2007Þ, Heger and Salehyan ð2007Þ, Bae and Ott ð2008Þ, Co-
laresi and Carey ð2008Þ, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol ð2008Þ, and Que-
rido ð2009Þ. With the exception of Querido ð2009Þ, these articles focus
mostly on the impact of poverty, ethnic diversity, and political regimes,
whereas we will put emphasis on natural resource variables and on the
role of the process of democratization. Moreover, we are the ﬁrst to study
mass killings both at the country level and using an ethnic group–level
panel.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we discuss the main
elements that need to be considered in the analysis of mass killings, in
Section III, we introduce our model, and in Sections IV and V, we pre-
sent all our theoretical ﬁndings and predictions. Section VI contains the
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empirical analysis, and Section VII presents conclusions. As usual, tech-
nical and supplemental materials are relegated to Appendices A and B.
II. Important Patterns of Mass Killings
Before diving into the analysis, it is useful to highlight the main patterns
of mass killings.
The ﬁrst fact to highlight is that almost all mass killing episodes in his-
tory were perpetrated by governments or dominant groups ðsee Harff
2003;Valentino et al. 2004; Eck andHultman 2007Þ. In order to be able to
carry out mass killings, a group needs to handle power and control the
military.2 A quote from Krain ð2000, 43Þ illustrates this well: “Military
victories by deﬁnition enable the winner to set the terms of the post–
internal war period. This may include the decision to punish the losing
side by eradicating them, thereby eliminating the problem of having to
live side by side with the enemy in the post–internal war state. This was
the solution chosen by the Congolese rebels who took control of what
would become Zaire in the mid-1960s.” Or in the words of Chirot and
McCauley ð2006, 2Þ, “conﬂict can become genocidal when powerful groups
think that the most efﬁcient means to get what they want is to eliminate
those in the way.”
Rummel points out that “power kills, absolute power kills absolutely”
ð1994, 1Þ and gives a strong quantitative idea of the preponderance of
government-decided killings when he states that “political regimes—
governments—have probably murdered nearly 170,000,000 of their own
citizens and foreigners in this century—about four times the number
killed in all international and domestic wars and revolutions” ð1995, 3Þ.
Another fact worth noting is that most mass killing events take place
toward the end of or after wars ðKrain 2000; Valentino et al. 2004Þ. The
usual sequence of events is indeed that there is ﬁrst a civil war and mass
killings take place only after victory. To put it in Krain’s ð2000, 46Þ words,
“internal wars are lethal twice over—in the actual bloody conﬂict, and in
the enhanced potential for state-sponsored mass murder subsequently.”
A third stylized fact to keep in mind is that not all forms of war are
equally likely to be accompanied by mass killings. A substantial fraction
of civil wars entail deliberate mass killings of civil noncombatants on a
large scale perpetrated by the dominant group, while there is almost
no record of mass killings of this sort in post–World War II interstate
2 Rebel groups are responsible for a very small part of mass killings of civilians, and they
are more likely to engage in killings if they are militarily strong relative to the government
ðHultman 2009Þ and after having won a military battle ðSchneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe
2012Þ. Usually killings by rebels take the form and objectives of terrorism, which is beyond
the scope of this paper ðfor this separate literature, see, e.g., Azam and Hoefﬂer ½2002 and
Bueno de Mesquita ½2010Þ.
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wars. Between 1960 and 2000, roughly a third of all civil wars ð50 out of
152Þ featured mass killings, while in none of the interstate wars ð23Þ were
there mass killings.3 In interstate disputes there is no supranational gov-
ernment budget to ﬁght for in terms of entitlements or the like, and
hence interstate wars typically take the form of territorial wars ðCaselli,
Morelli, and Rohner 2015Þ.
One distinctive feature of mass killings that clearly separates this
deadly option from other forms of weakening the opposition group ðe.g.,
imprisonments, internments, expropriations, and disenfranchisementsÞ
is that mass killings are designed to reduce the size of the opponent
groups, either directly or by causing refugee outﬂows and displacements
ðmultiplier effect; see Krain 2000, 41Þ.
The model we now turn to is greatly motivated by all these facts.
III. Model
There are two groups, i and j, with initial population sizes Ni, Nj. With-
out loss of generality, let j be the group in power in the initial period in
the analysis. The social surplus S to be shared in each period comes from
two sources: ðiÞ a constant per-period amount R from the exploitation of
a natural resource and ðiiÞ output produced by labor, for which we as-
sume a rigid labor supply, so that the output of production at time t is
bN t 5 bðN ti 1 N tj Þ. We can think of b > 0 as individual productivity de-
termined by education as well as by technology. Hence, the surplus to be
shared in the ﬁrst period is
S 5 bðNi 1 NjÞ1 R :
In the following periods in the inﬁnite horizon game the only potential
alteration of such a per-period surplus can come via changes in the pop-
ulation size.
We assume that if there is conﬂict in a period, the winner seizes the
entire surplus of that period,minus a loss d caused by the conﬂict.We also
assume that the probability of victory in war at time t for group h, h 5 i,
j, is equal to the relative population size in that period, N th=N
t .
The common discount factor is denoted as usual by d ∈ ½0, 1Þ. The last
piece of notation is the fairness level lth chosen by h when in power at
time t: if h is in power and offers a share xth of the surplus to group k ≠ h,
such a share xth is decomposed as a fairness parameter l
t
h times the rel-
3 To compute this, we took data onmass killings in wars from Valentino et al. ð2004Þ, civil
wars data from Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Rohner ð2009Þ, and data on interstate wars from
Expanded War Data compiled by Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward. According to Val-
entino et al., the only mass killings during interstate war in recent decades took place dur-
ing the Korean War, 1950–53 ðwhich shared many features with civil warsÞ.
1092 journal of political economy
ative group size of group k at the time of surplus sharing, xth 5 l
t
hðN tk =N tÞ,
with lth ∈ ½0;N t=N tk .
Let group h be in power at the beginning of time t. The time line in
period t is as follows:
1. Production: Production takes place, the surplus is collected, and the
group in power announces a distribution of this surplus between
the two groups.
2. Peace or conﬂict: The two groups decide simultaneously whether
to have conﬂict or peace, where peace prevails only if both choose
peace. In case of conﬂict, an amount d of the surplus is destroyed.
Group h remains in power in case of peace and in case it wins the war,
whereas group k ≠ h obtains power only by winning the civil war.
3. Exercise of power: This has two dimensions. First, the group in power
keeps all the surplus in case of victory or carries out the announced
distribution in case of peace. Second, the ruler may decide to elim-
inate members of the other group, without surpassing a cumula-
tive upper boundM .
4. Consumption: Consumption takes place.
Even though the game is not technically a repeated game ðgiven that
the population size and the identity of the group in power are state
variables that can make the stage game in two consecutive periods dif-
ferentÞ, the multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria of this game fol-
lows a logic similar to that of standard folk theorems. Hence, as is com-
mon practice in repeated games, we focus on the characterization of the
best subgame perfect equilibrium ðSPEÞ, that is, on the SPE that max-
imizes social surplus. Henceforth in the paper we will refer to this equi-
librium selection as best SPE or as “the equilibrium” when it does not
create confusion.
Focusing on the best equilibrium is particularly common in industrial
organization ðe.g., Levin 2003Þ. For recent articles in political econom-
ics focusing on the best equilibrium, see, for example, Yared ð2010Þ, van
Weelden ð2013Þ, and Wolitzky ð2013Þ. Beside being common practice,
this equilibrium selection has an important conceptual motivation for
our objectives: showing that war and mass killings could occur in some
“bad” equilibriumbecause of coordination failures when other equilibria
without violence also exist would be, in our view, much less interesting
and forceful. It is when the best SPE displays war and mass killings that
we obtain the sense that such events are inescapable for certain situa-
tions, whereas when players could coordinate on a better equilibrium,
the sense of inescapable faith would be lost.
In order to characterize the best SPE, we will ﬁrst characterize the
“worst” SPE, that is, the one with the smallest social surplus. Then, in
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the construction of the best SPE, we follow Abreu ð1986, 1988Þ ðsee also
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 160ff.Þ using the worst equilibrium strategy
as a punishment threat against any deviation from the best equilibrium
strategy.4 Hence, to achieve the best SPE, both players follow a “grim
trigger proﬁle,” which is deﬁned as the credible threat to play the worst
SPE following a deviation of the opponent from the best SPE. This phase
of worst SPE being played during the entire future after a deviation will
be referred to as the “punishment phase.”
In the exercise of power stage of each period, institutions, regimes,
and perhaps third parties can enter the picture: in the unlimited power
benchmark, the group in power has full discretion to choose the division
of the surplus of that period and the number of killings to perpetrate.
However, power is usually limited or constrained, by institutions, social
norms, or international pressure, and we will capture these limits to the
exercise of power by means of two parameters: l andM .
The ﬁrst of these two constraints can be interpreted as a constraint
to the exploitation of the powerless group: saying that in peace the share
of the surplus going to group k cannot be lower than lðN tk =N tÞ implies
that the democratic institutions, checks and balances, or general toler-
ance of unequal treatment in society does not permit a degree of ex-
ploitation represented by any l < l and hence implies that if the group
in power violates that constraint, the standing institutions are violated.
For the upper bound on total allowable mass killingsM to be binding,
it has to be lower than the minimum between Ni and Nj, whereas oth-
erwise the full extermination of a minority group is possible.
Note that for both types of bounds not only do domestic factors, such
as social norms, play a role, but these bounds are also related to the level
of pressure from the international community threatening with a mili-
tary intervention if basic humanitarian rules on fairness or respect for
human life are violated.
We organize the analysis as follows: ﬁrst, in the next section, we study
the benchmark unlimited power case, where there are no constraints on
either exploitation or mass killings. The degree of exploitation of the
powerless group ﬁnds its binding constraint in the need to make sure
that such a group does not rebel rather than in exogenous institutions or
social norms. Then, in Section V, we will characterize the equilibrium
even for the more complex case in which l and M can be binding,
emphasizing the differences in terms of predictions with respect to the
unlimited power benchmark.
4 Our analysis does not exclude that the same equilibrium outcome could be supported
also with less destructive threats.
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IV. Equilibrium Analysis with Unlimited Power
In this section we characterize the equilibrium in the unlimited power
case. We shall start with a series of claims that will be used for the
construction of the lemma characterizing the worst SPE.
Claim 1. Because of the simultaneous move war declaration stage,
there always exist equilibria with war at the very start of the game. The
punishment phase of a grim trigger profile always starts with a war.
However, we also make the following claim.
Claim 2. War forever cannot be sustained as an SPE.
Proof. The winner of the ﬁrst war can choose the level of mass killings
M and l without constraints. Let us show that choosing M 5 0 in antic-
ipation of more periods of war and no mass killings cannot be rational.
Suppose ﬁrst that group i would never want to do mass killings. Con-
sider a subgame after a war that ended with a victory of j, at a history
with no prior mass killing. Group j’s trade-off at that node is as follows:
When exterminating the opponent it obtains













It is easy to see that mass killings are always preferred to continued
conﬂict. A fortiori, if group i allowed itself to do mass killings, group j
would have an even larger relative gain from mass killings at the node of
exercise of power after victory in a civil war. The same logic applies if i is
in power after the ﬁrst war. QED
5 To see this, consider the value for j to be in power when entering a new period, de-








where V ij is the value for j after giving up power to i. Under permanent conﬂict, the value of
being in opposition is identical to that of being in power because power does not give any







Consequently, the payoff from winning and not exterminating the opponent is ðS 2 dÞ 1
dVj.
strategic mass killings 1095
Claim 3. There exists an SPE strategy profile Σo in which ð1Þ both
groups always choose war in any period in which they both exist, and
ð2Þ there is full extermination of the opponent by whoever is in power
at the first occasion.
Proof. Deviating by not selecting war is not a worthwhile deviation, as
war will occur as long as at least one of the players selects it. The only
one-period deviation to be evaluated is the decision by a winning group
h to choose M < Nk, k ≠ h. After such a one-period deviation from full
extermination, in the following period a new war takes place, followed
by extermination by the winner. When doing full extermination, group
h obtains




In contrast, when doingM < Nk, group h obtains after reformulation the
expected payoff











which is always smaller than the payoff from doing full mass killings right
away. Hence, there cannot be a worthwhile deviation, and the strategy
proﬁle Σo with full extermination by whoever is in power at the ﬁrst oc-
casion must be an equilibrium. QED
The above claims allow us to state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The strategy profile Σo is the worst SPE of the game, con-
sisting of strategies by the two players with immediate war followed by
full mass killings by the winner.
We are now ready to characterize the best SPE, obtained by reverting
to Σo after any deviation.
Consider a candidate stationary SPE path in which j remains in power
forever, there is never war or mass killings, and the fairness level is lj
every period; whereas after any deviation from this path, the two players
enter the punishment phase constituted by the worst SPE continuation
characterized above.
Conditional on having had peace before, the value for group i from
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Thus, i prefers the stationary peaceful path as long as
1
12 d





lj ≥ loj ;
S 2 dð12 dÞ2 dbNj
S
: ð1Þ
Note that loj is increasing in R, meaning that the more natural resource
rents there are, the more difﬁcult it is to keep the minority group peace-
ful.6 Further, loj is decreasing in d because high destruction costs of war
deter rebellion.
Now that we have computed the loj that, if chosen every period, elim-
inates the incentives to deviate for group i, we need to check the incen-
tives to deviate by group j.




















ðNj=N ÞS 1 ðNi=N Þ½dð12 dÞ1 dbNj 
12 d
:
Two types of deviations are possible: mass killings or exploitation, where
by the latter we mean the decision by group j to give lj 5 0 in the devia-




ðS 2 bNiÞ: ð2Þ











It is immediate that the payoff from mass killings is always larger than
the payoff of exploitation alone. Hence, the most proﬁtable deviation to
consider is mass killings.
Peace is preferred by j to mass killings iff






6 Note also that if d > ð<Þ bNj, then loj is increasing ðdecreasingÞ in d. Intuitively, when theðimmediateÞ loss of war weights heavier than the ðfutureÞ production loss from having a
decimated population, then an impatient opposition is less inclined to rebel.
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After some manipulations, the condition can be written as follows:
R < Roj ; dbNj 2 ð12 dÞðbN 2 dÞ: ð4Þ
This is the no-mass-killing incentive compatibility ðNo-MK ICÞ condition.
Similarly, the No-MK IC condition when i is in power is R < Roi ; dbNi 2
ð12 dÞðbN 2 dÞ.
All the above analysis leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
I. If R < Roj , the best SPE is a peaceful steady state with fairness level
loj , which is increasing in R.
II. If R > Roj , the best SPE involves war and extermination at the ﬁrst
occasion, perpetrated by whoever is in power at the end of the war.
We remark that in the unlimited power case there are no parameter
values under which the best SPE involves exploitation.
Remark 1. There are no parameter values under which the best
SPE can display exploitation ðlj 5 0Þ without mass killings.
To see this, note that the immediate effects of exploitation and mass
killings in terms of distributive consequences are the same, as far as the
payoffs for the governing group in that period are concerned. Further,
we know that in both cases j would trigger a punishment phase with war
and mass killings, where j would risk to be the one killed. This is always
dominated by killing right away, as follows from equations ð2Þ and ð3Þ.
Proposition 1 below displays the comparative statics from the equi-
librium characterization obtained above, that is, the effect of changes in
the value of the different parameters on the resource threshold for mass
killing incentive.
Proposition 1. There is an increase in the value of the threshold
level of R above which an equilibrium with mass killings exists when
• d is larger;
• the size of the group in opposition Ni/N is smaller, and hence the
size of the group in power Nj/N is larger;7
• b or N is larger, for d sufﬁciently high;
• d is larger, unless d is very large.
V. Equilibrium Analysis with Bounds on Power
We shall now allow the possibility that the limits to the exercise of power
l andM may be binding.
7 On average, one should expect larger groups to be more frequently in ofﬁce than
smaller groups. In the frequent case in which the group in power is the larger group, a
decrease in the size of the group out of power corresponds to lower polarization.
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A. Binding Constraint on Exploitation Only
Let us ﬁrst analyze what happens when l > loj ðRÞ, that is, when the limit
to exploitation is binding, while for now let us keep the constraint on
mass killings not binding.
Note ﬁrst that when offered l, group i is willing to keep peace, given
that l > loj . The incentive constraint that matters is therefore the one
concerning the group in power: under what conditions does j offer l
rather than deviating to full exploitation, abandoning all constitutional
constraints, or to mass killings?









Thus, group j will remain peaceful and refrain from mass killings iff
l < LðRÞ; d bN
bN 1 R
: ð5Þ
Note that LðRÞ is decreasing in R and equals loj ðRÞ exactly at R 5 Roj 5
dbNj 2 ð12 dÞðbN 2 dÞ. Recall that exploitation alone ðl 5 0 in the
deviation periodÞ is dominated by the extermination deviation, some-
thing that is going to be revisited below, in the general case in which
bounds exist to both types of exercise of power.
Remark 2. If M is not binding, the comparative statics of propo-
sition 1 continue to hold even in the presence of a binding l. The ad-
ditional result is that the probability of peace is ðweaklyÞ decreasing in l.
B. Worst Equilibrium with Binding Constraints on All Forms of Power
The next lemma characterizes the worst SPE of the game when on top
of bounds on exploitation we also add the boundM <minfNi ;Njg on
killings.
Lemma 3. For any M <minfNi ;Njg, and for any l, the worst SPE is
as follows:
1. If R ≥ d, then the worst SPE for the punishment phase involves war
every period, with both groups killingM opponents at the ﬁrst oc-
casion of power.
2. On the other hand, if R < d, the worst SPE involves war forever but
without mass killings.
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Proof. Consider a subgame in which one group h has already killedM
opponents in the past and hence can no longer have access to additional
killings. If at the beginning of this subgame h is out of power, then the
trade-off for the group k that just conquered power becomes as follows.
If k kills, it obtains
Nk 2M
N 2 2M
S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
;
since after the revenge killings, the continuation worst SPE involves war
forever without further killings allowed.
If k does not kill, it obtains8
Nk 2M
N 2M
S 2 bM 2 d
12 d
:
Thus, performing mass killings is preferred if R > d.
Further, if h had the option to still do mass killings in the future, then,
a fortiori, k would have incentives to do mass killings when R > d.
In contrast, for R < d, when h does indeed not want to kill, then k does
not want to kill either, as shown above. This fully characterizes the worst
SPE, which always involves war, and hence l never matters. QED
Armed with this lemma, we can now characterize the best SPE in the
bounded power setting.
C. Best Equilibrium Characterization When Both Types of Power
May Have Binding Constraints
In this section, we are going to characterize the best SPE with peace or
with conﬂict by separately examining the cases in which d ≥ R and d < R.
Lemma 4. Let d ≥ R. The best SPE involves peace if and only if
d ≥
12 d









Otherwise, the best SPE involves conﬂict.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium strategy proﬁle involving peace,
assuming it exists, with group j in power offering lj every period. From
lemma 3 we know that when group i deviates from peace and engages in
rebellion, it triggers the punishment phase with conﬂict in every period






8 Note that if postponing the killings for the future is a preferred strategy, this has to
continue to be preferred in any future occasion k is in power. Hence, the relevant strategy
alternative to doing the killings is to never kill, as we do here.
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Now turn to the trade-off for j. Consider ﬁrst the case in which














Both “exploitation” ði.e., grabbing all the pie but not doing any mass
killingsÞ and mass killings will trigger the punishment phase. Group j’s













ðS 2 bM 2 dÞ:
Checking which constraint is binding shows that for R < d, exploita-
tion is preferred to mass killings, and hence exploitation is the relevant
outside option.
Group j prefers peace to exploitation iff
d ≥
12 d
11 dðNj=NiÞ S :
ðNote that for d < S, this threshold is always bounded between zero and
one.Þ
If instead l > 12 ðd=SÞ, the condition under which j prefers peace
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The above lemma tells us that there is an important difference be-
tween the unlimited power benchmark and the analysis when both types
of power can be limited.
Remark 3. In the presence of effective bounds on power, it is no
longer the case that exploitation of minority groups is always dominated
by mass killings. In fact, when d ≥ R, it is the opposite.
As long as the nonproduced rents R are small relative to the cost of
conﬂict d, there will be no mass killings.9 However, for R > d, the worst
SPE is similar to the one in the unlimited power case; hence the char-
acterization of the best SPE will again involve thresholds below which
mass killings will occur, and once again, most importantly, the proba-
bility of such a scenario is increasing in R .
Lemma 5. LetM <minfNi ; Njg and d < R. There exist thresholds R*h ,
l*h , and L
*
h , h 5 i, j, such that the following conditions are true:
i. The best SPE involves peace if and only if R ≤ R*j and l ≤max
fl*j ; L*j g.
ii. When R > R*j and/or l >maxfl*j ; L*j g, the best SPE involves war
in the ﬁrst period; and if group j wins, it commits mass killingsM .
If group i wins, it commits mass killings M iff R > R*i and/or
l >maxfl*i ; L*i g, while for R ≤ R*i and l ≤maxfl*i ; L*i g, the best
SPE involves peace ever after. When mass killings occurred at the
end of the ﬁrst period, there exist thresholds R**i , R**j , L**i , and L**j
such that ðaÞ if the winner of the ﬁrst war is h5 i, j and R ≤ R**h ðand
l ≤ L**h , in case l is bindingÞ, then peace follows ever after; while
ðbÞ if R > R**h ðand/or l > L**h , in case l is bindingÞ, then war con-
tinues until power shifts, at which point the second mass killing
M takes place, and peace follows after that.
We relegate the ðtediousÞ proof of this crucial characterization lemma
to Appendix A ðthe proof also contains the deﬁnitions of all thresholds
used in lemma 5Þ. In the zone in between the two thresholds R*i and R*j ,
the occurrence of mass killings depends on the identity of the winner of
the war in the ﬁrst period.
In ﬁgure 1 we graphically display in the space ðR ; lÞ the different
zones derived under lemmas 4 and 5, for a numerical example with the
particular parameter values d 5 50, Ni 5 50, Nj 5 50, b 5 1,M 5 5, and
d 5 0.6. Hence, regular produced output ðbN Þ has a value of 100, and
the destruction cost of war ðd Þ corresponds in this example to half of
9 This is why in the statement of lemma 4 we need not refer to whether M is larger or
smaller than the population of either group.
1102 journal of political economy
the produced output. Other parameter values lead to different sizes of
the zones, but qualitatively the picture looks the same.10
Using the bounds of lemma 4, we can display what happens when R <
d. In this case, mass killings never occur. Moving to the region where R >
d, we need to apply the bounds from lemma 5. For values of R < R*5 114
and l < L*ðRÞ ðwhich corresponds to the lower downward-sloping lineÞ,
there is peace.11 Then there is a small corridor between R* and R** 5 118
and between the two downward-sloping L*ðRÞ and L**ðRÞ lines, where only
the winner of the ﬁrst-period conﬂict performs mass killings and from
then on successfully “buys off” the opponent group. For all other values of
R and l ði.e., to the right of R** and above the L**ðRÞ lineÞ, there will be
mass killings of the maximum possible amount at the earliest occasion by
both groups. In other words, in that zone the equilibrium path involves
mass killings and then revengemass killings at the ﬁrst timepower switches.
The substantive predictions of the model are contained in the next
proposition.
FIG. 1.—Zonesof peace, exploitation, andmass killings ðford550,Ni550,Nj550,b51,
M 5 5, and d 5 0.6Þ.
10 Naturally, the quantitative location of the thresholds depends substantially on the
parameter values. For example, for a country with the same parameter values but low de-
struction costs ði.e., d 5 1.5Þ and intermediate patience ði.e., d 5 0.85Þ, mass killings would
be harder to avoid. In particular, the zone of mass killings happening only once would be
empty ðR ** < R *Þ and there would be mass killings by both groups for R > R * 5 8.
11 Note that given that in this numerical example there is Ni 5 Nj, we have R*i 5 R*j ,
R**i 5 R**j , L*i 5 L*j , and L**i 5 L**j , which simpliﬁes the graphical exposition.
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Proposition 2.
I. As in the unlimited power benchmark, it continues to be true that
the threshold on R above which there are mass killings in the best
SPE is decreasing in Ni/N and increasing in d, b, and N for sufﬁ-
ciently high d.
II. The threshold on R above which there are mass killings in the best
SPE is ðweaklyÞ decreasing in l.
III. If d is sufﬁciently high, then the strictly positive value of M that
maximizes the threshold for R above which there are mass killings
is always interior ði.e., it is a concave function of MÞ, and the one
that maximizes the threshold on R above which there are mass
killings is M 5 ðbN 2 dÞ=4b.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Part I of proposition 2 conﬁrms the validity of the comparative statics
of the benchmark proposition 1 even for the limited power case, while
part II establishes that for third parties interested in minimizing the
probability of mass killings or even the probability of war, it is never
advisable to generate effective lower bounds on distributive exploitation.
On the other hand, part III establishes that the design of optimal limits
to elimination of citizens may be effective, but the desirability of how
much to tighten such a constraint depends on the population size, the
productivity of the economy, and the cost of war.12
Table 1 provides an overview of what happens for different constraints
onM , keeping all other parameter values as before. Given that the value
of the nonresource economy ðbNÞ equals 100, the values of R*j and R**j in
this table correspond to the resource abundance as a percentage of the
nonresource economy. Hence, a value of R*j of, say, 200 would mean that
the threshold lies at a level of resource rents being twice as large as the
nonresource economy.
The effect of the level of the capM on mass killings is ambiguous even
for interior values of d. IncreasingM from a low to a medium level makes
mass killings less likely to occur, while increasingM further to a very high
level results in an increase of the mass killings risk. This means that in
examples like this, the probability of mass killings is minimized by some
interior level ofM , as established formally for the case of d→ 1 ðsee the
proof of proposition 2Þ.
12 Two remarks are in order. First, it goes without saying that if it was possible to costlessly
enforce a complete ban of any killings, selectingM 5 0 would be optimal. Second, notice
as well that changes to the level ofM affect not only the threshold on R above which there
are mass killings but also the level of mass killings in case they take place. Hence there
could be situations with a trade-off between reducing the likelihood vs. the potential extent
of mass killings.
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Note that for many of the parameter constellations in which mass
killings are the most likely, that is, for relatively high polarization and
relatively lowM, the thresholds of R*j and R**j are relatively close together,
meaning that with a uniform distribution of parameters, and of R in par-
ticular, the probability that the best SPE involves mass killings on both
sides ðwith a sequence of wars between the ﬁrst and the last mass killings
episodeÞmay be on average higher than the probability of observingmass
killings on one side only. Hence, for many contexts one could observe
serial correlation of mass killings.
A ﬁnal intuitive note about the role of theM constraint: in a world
in which there is no such upper bound, the game ends with the extermi-
nation of the opponent. Extermination has a cost, but it grants full ap-
propriation of the remaining surplus. The introduction of a binding cap
M induces different considerations, because the victorious group will
have to take into account that the game will continue with the surviv-
ing rival population. Mass killings have multiple effects: ð1Þ for any given
level of fairness, the reduction in the number of people in the other
group increases the share of the surplus that the group in power will ob-
tain; ð2Þ mass killings increase the probability of winning for the group in
power in future wars; but ð3Þ mass killings reduce the overall surplus size.
How important this reduction is depends on the weight of the nonpro-
duced rents. If the nonproduced rents are small, the third effect domi-
nates and mass killings are avoided. But if R is sufﬁciently large, mass
killings become more attractive as the surplus shrinks relatively less after
massacres. The nonmonotonic effect of the bound on the power to kill
depends on the importance of effect 2. Themore the future is discounted,
the more prominent will be the weight given to the more direct, immedi-
ate gains.13
13 Putting the effects together, the cap M that makes mass killings least attractive is
intermediate, at least when the players are patient enough. When d is sufﬁciently low, the
direct effect dominates and we may have mass killings in the best SPE for all levels of
M , provided that R is large enough.
TABLE 1
Effects of Caps on Mass Killings
Cap on Mass Killings R*j R**j
Low maximum mass killings level ðM 5 5Þ 114 118
Medium maximum mass killings level ðM 5 10Þ 125 138
Medium-high maximum mass killings level ðM 5 20Þ 141 183
High maximum mass killings level ðM 5 30Þ 143 246
Very high maximum mass killings level ðM 5 40Þ 131 380
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D. Discussion on the Risks of Democratization Processes
The equilibrium characterization for every pair of constraints to the ex-
ercise of power allows us to also draw some broad theoretical conclusions
on the effect of a minimum fairness norm. If l is very high, the group in
power will not be able to impose a sufﬁciently advantageous share of
the surplus when avoiding mass killings. Hence, too high a lmay induce
immediate assassinations. This means that historical moments in which
a group in power expects some serious reduction in its ability to extract
surplus from other groups’ production or from natural resources, for
example, moments of expected democratization pressures, may be the
most dangerous moments in terms of mass killings incentives.
An important example of a sudden increase in l is when international
pressure pushes a country to initiate a process of democratization. The
existing quantitative literature focuses almost exclusively on the level of
democracy rather than the process of democratization. However, there is
ample case study evidence available on the effects of democratization.
On the basis of extensive historical examples, Mann ð2005Þ argues that
“murderous cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of democ-
racy” ð2Þ and that “regimes newly embarked upon democratization are
more likely to commitmurderous ethnic cleansing than are stable author-
itarian regimes” ð4Þ. Snyder ð2000Þ makes the same observation: “Rocky
transitions to democracy often give rise to warlike nationalism and vio-
lent ethnic conﬂicts” ð15–16Þ.
According to Mann, “ethnic cleansing diffuses along with the process
of democratization” ð2005, 505Þ, and a ﬁrst peak was reached already
during imperialism: “Colonial cleansings did represent the ﬁrst dark side
of emerging modern democracy. Where settlers enjoyed de facto self-
rule, these were in local reality the most democratic regimes in the world
at the time” ð107Þ.14
Looming democratization has also been noted to have critical effects
on the risks of civilianmassacres by Mansﬁeld and Snyder ð2005, 5Þ: “The
1993 elections in Burundi—even though internationally mandated, free,
and fair—intensiﬁed ethnic polarization between the Hutu and Tutsi
ethnic groups, resulting in some 200,000 deaths.” Democratization has
also been identiﬁed as a contributing factor to the genocide in Rwanda
ðMann 2005, chaps. 14–15Þ. Mansﬁeld and Snyder refer to “power shar-
ing and pluralism as precursors to the Rwandan genocide. In Rwanda, as
in Burundi, the pressures to democratize applied by the international
donors that were the source of 60 percent of the Rwandan government’s
revenue played a central role in triggering ethnic slaughter” ð2005, 255Þ.
14 In line with the mechanism of our model, “the two ethnic groups clashed over a mo-
nopolistic economic resource, land, and most settlers did not need native labor to work
it” ðMann 2005, 109Þ.
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Further, “in East Timor, a favorable vote on independence from Indone-
sia in an internationally mandated 1999 referendum spurred Indonesian-
backed Timorese militias to unleash large-scale backlash violence, cre-
ating an international refugee crisis” ð6Þ. Regarding the case of Darfur
discussed in Section I, peace agreements in other parts of Sudan brought
the expectation of “looming elections” and democratization ðStraus 2005Þ,
and this may have played a role in the decision to massacre the minority
group.
Also in ex-Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, the prospects of
democratization and rent sharing according to group sizes played a role
in the slaughtering ðMann 2005, chaps. 12–13Þ. “Democratization had
brought Yugoslavia into the danger zone” ð376Þ; “less than six months
after the ﬁrst democratic elections were held in former Yugoslav re-
publics, the country was at war” ðWoodward 1995, 17Þ, and soon there-
after there were the biggest massacres of civilians in recent European
history. Snyder concludes that “the pathologies of incipient democrati-
zation played a central role in the nationalist conﬂicts in Yugoslav and
the Caucasus” ð2000, 250Þ. Indeed, after the fall of communism, “partial
democratization and partial increases in press freedom occurred before
the outbreak of ethnic conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia, before the
escalation in the ﬁghting between Armenians and the former Soviet
republic of Azerbaijan, and in Russia, the perpetrator of the war against
the ethnic separatist Chechens” ð28Þ. Further examples in which de-
mocratization fueled incentives for ethnic massacres include, among
others, Armenia ðMann 2005, chaps. 5–6Þ, Kashmir ðMann 2005, 486ff.Þ,
Georgia ðSnyder 2000, 232–34Þ, and Sri Lanka ðSnyder 2000, 275–80Þ.
Note that our theoretical results summarized in proposition 2 are
broadly consistent with the characteristics of these cases of democrati-
zation triggers: While for countries that are either extremely natural
resource poor ðR < dÞ or extremely rich in natural resources ðR > R**j Þ,
an exogenous democratization constraint is never the trigger of mass
killings,15 for the bulk of countries with low to intermediate resource
abundance, mass killings can occur as a result of a hike in l; indeed
many of the cases mentioned above are situations in which natural
resource holding would be thought of as low to intermediate.
VI. Empirical Analysis
In this section we shall confront some of our predictions with data.
While we keep the analysis and discussion deliberately streamlined and
concise in this section, the full empirical analysis containing a critical
15 This is the case since for R < d mass killings never take place and for R > R ** mass
killings always happen twice, independently of l ðsee lemma 5Þ.
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discussion of the existing literature and various robustness checks is
available in the online appendix.
One of the main purposes of the country-level regressions in subsec-
tion A is to assess how robust the existing empirical evidence on mass
killings is when important econometric issues are taken into account.
Further, we want to include in the analysis several new variables, in par-
ticular on natural resource abundance, which plays a crucial role in our
model but has been largely neglected in the existing literature on mass
killings.
In subsection B we study the effects of mass killings.
The ethnic group–level analysis performed in subsection C examines
for the ﬁrst time what kind of ethnic groups are targeted in mass killings.
Surprisingly, the existing literature has studied mass killings only either
on a very aggregate level ði.e., with cross-country panelsÞ or on a very dis-
aggregate level ði.e., case studies of single countriesÞ. Studying victimi-
zation in massacres with a global panel of ethnic groups is useful, as de-
cisions to commit massacres are strategic decisions at the group level ðas
emphasized in our modelÞ.
A. Country-Level Evidence on the Determinants of Mass Killings
We start by assessing the explanatory factors of mass killings using panel
data for a cross section of countries. For our dependent variable we rely
on the most widely used data set on mass killings, collected by the Po-
litical Instability Task Force under the direction of Barbara Harff. They
deﬁne mass killings as events that “involve the promotion, execution,
and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their
agents—or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or
politicized noncommunal group.” By this deﬁnition, 268 country-years
ð3.5 percent of all observationsÞ experience mass killings between 1955
and 2007. These killing episodes take place in 28 different countries and
include all of the most notorious historical instances of large-scale mas-
sacres such as, for example, the ones in Sudan, Rwanda, Bosnia, or Cam-
bodia. Countries that have experienced mass killings differ on various
dimensions emphasized in our theory. Notably, they are much more nat-
ural resource dependent, poorer, and more ethnically polarized.16 De-
termining whether these differences hold up in a regression analysis with
various controls will be the task to which we turn below.
16 In countries with mass killings, natural resource production amounts to, on average,
10 percent of their GDP while for the rest of the country sample this is 5 percent; their GDP
per capita averages US$1,220 as compared to the rest of the sample, where it is $6,150, and
ethnic polarization equals 0.6 compared to 0.5 in the rest of the sample. All three differ-
ences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
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Our sample contains all countries that are in the Correlates of War
system, that is, all countries that have some minimum size and interna-
tional recognition, and covers the years 1960–2007 ðmost key explana-
tory variables start in 1960Þ. This leaves us in table 2 with between 3,016
and 3,057 observations depending on the speciﬁcation. In the online
appendix, all variables are explained in detail and summary descriptive
statistics are provided.
TABLE 2




Oil production/GDP ðt 2 1Þ 6.82***
ð1.73Þ
Total resource depletion ðt 2 1Þ 7.69***
ð2.40Þ
GDP per capita ðt 2 1Þ 2.14* 2.10 2.10
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.10Þ
Democratization ðover last 5 yearsÞ .14** .11** .20***
ð.06Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ
Ethnic polarization 4.56** 5.12** 4.64**
ð2.12Þ ð2.31Þ ð1.90Þ
Population ðt 2 1Þ 2.04*** 2.04** 2.04***
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.01Þ
Democracy ðt 2 1Þ 2.04 2.06 2.05
ð.05Þ ð.06Þ ð.04Þ
Trade/GDP ðt 2 1Þ 23.99*** 23.64*** 22.49***
ð1.30Þ ð1.16Þ ð.88Þ
Civil war incidence 1.34 1.66* 1.69*
ð.85Þ ð.89Þ ð.94Þ
Chief executive military 1.36* 1.11 1.08
ð.79Þ ð.73Þ ð.71Þ
Population density ðt 2 1Þ 2.05 .59 1.74
ð2.60Þ ð3.86Þ ð1.10Þ
Mountainous terrain 21.82 22.88** 21.35
ð1.19Þ ð1.47Þ ð1.48Þ
Incidence mass killings ðt 2 1Þ 7.66*** 7.42*** 7.97***
ð.88Þ ð.80Þ ð.89Þ
Democratization  oil production > 80th percentile 2.20***
ð.07Þ
Oil production > 80th percentile dummy 2.06***
ð.65Þ
Observations 3,016 3,057 3,016
Pseudo R 2 .825 .821 .832
Note.—The unit of observation is a country in a given year. The sample covers all coun-
tries of the Correlates of War list and the years 1960–2007. Logit regressions with intercept
in all columns. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
All speciﬁcations control for unreported annual time dummies.
* Signiﬁcant at p < .1.
** Signiﬁcant at p < .05.
*** Signiﬁcant at p < .01.
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We consider the following benchmark logit model:
log

PðMass killingsc;y 5 1Þ









where the left-hand side is the logarithm of the ratio of the probability
of mass killings over the probability of no mass killings, with the mass
killings variable varying at the country ðcÞ and year ðyÞ levels. Coefﬁcient
a denotes the constant,W
0
c y a vector of variables that vary at the country
and year levels, X
0
c a vector of variables that vary at the country level, and
Z
0
y a vector of annual time dummies; b, g, and d are vectors of coefﬁcients.
We use the standard controls of the existing literature ðwhich is criti-
cally reviewed in the online appendixÞ and add natural resource abun-
dance variables. All variables used are described in detail in Appendix B.
Given that traditionally papers in the related literature on civil wars
ðiÞ often usemeasures of natural resource abundance relative toGDP and
ðiiÞ predominantly focus on oil ðsee, e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier
and Hoefﬂer 2004Þ, it makes sense to use oil production as a share of
GDP ðfrom 2009 British Petroleum dataÞ as the main natural resource
measure.
Column 1 of table 2 ðas well as the various robustness checks in the
online appendixÞ strongly conﬁrms the theoretical prediction that mass
killings are the more likely the larger the role of natural resources R in
the economy ðsigniﬁcant at the 1 percent levelÞ. When controlling for
natural resource abundance, GDP per capita proxies b and d. This vari-
able has the expected mass killing reducing sign and is signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. In line with our theory, democratization in the last 5 years
is found to increase the mass killings risk ðsigniﬁcant at the 5 percent
levelÞ. Further, ethnic polarization is found, as expected, to increase the
risk of mass killings ðsigniﬁcant at the 5 percent levelÞ. The population
size N has the expected negative effect on the mass killings likelihood
ðsigniﬁcant at the 1 percent levelÞ.
In column 2 a broader measure of total resource depletion per gross
national income is used ðfromWorld Bank data onAdjustedNet SavingsÞ.
This captures the total rents from energy, mineral, and forest exploita-
tion. It has a positive sign and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The re-
sults for various other alternative measures of natural resource abun-
dance are relegated to the online appendix.
Finally, in column 3 we display an additional result on democratiza-
tion and mass killings. In our theory the l constraint affects the mass
killings likelihood only for low to intermediate levels of natural re-
sources lying between d and R** ðsee also the discussion at the end of
Sec. V.DÞ. The obvious difﬁculty of capturing this nonmonotonicity in
the data is that the thresholds d and R** are unknown and are likely to
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vary widely between countries. It is reasonable to think that, at least for
many developing countries, the destruction costs of war are relatively
low.17 In column 3 we discretize our natural resource measure and create
a dummy taking a value of one when a country is above the 80th per-
centile of oil production ðwhich corresponds to oil production account-
ing for 5.9 percent of GDPÞ. We ﬁnd that the uninteracted democra-
tization measure has a positive coefﬁcient ðwhich is signiﬁcant at the
1 percent levelÞ and that the interaction term of democratization with
the dummy of oil production above the 80th percentile has a negative
sign that is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.18 These two coefﬁcients are
jointly nonsigniﬁcant, which implies that democratization increases the
mass killings risk only for R below the 80th percentile of resource abun-
dance, while it has no effect for the 20 percent most resource-rich ob-
servations. This is of course by no means a conclusive test of this non-
monotonic feature of our theory, but it is at least consistent with our
predictions, provided that the d andR** thresholds are relatively low.
Note that the results are very similar when restricting the sample to
poor countries, that is, to observations with below-median GDP per cap-
ita, for which d is indeed likely to be low ðreported in col. 8 of table A2
in the online appendixÞ. Notice also that we obtain similar results for
higher thresholds. For example, when interacting democratization with
oil production above the 95th percentile ðcorresponding to oil produc-
tion accounting for above 41 percent of GDPÞ, we again ﬁnd the coefﬁ-
cient of the interaction term to be negative and signiﬁcant and democ-
ratization to increase mass killings only in the 95 percent least oil-rich
countries and to have no effect for the 5 percent largest oil producers
ðreported in col. 9 of table A2 in the online appendixÞ.
Let us brieﬂy discuss the quantitative importance of the key variables
of our analysis. In what follows we discuss the marginal effects based on
table 2, column 1. The unconditional baseline risk of mass killings is
3.5 percent, and the average value of oil production in percent of GDP
is 5.8 percent ðnote that the means and standard deviations of all var-
iables are displayed in table A4 in the online appendixÞ. The marginal
effect of an increase from 0 percent to 100 percent of the size of oil
production with respect to GDP corresponds to an increase of 3.4 per-
centage points of mass killings risk. Put differently, while a country with
all average characteristics but no oil has an annual mass killings risk of
3.3 percent, a country with exactly the same characteristics but an oil
production value of 75 percent of its GDP ðwhich is about the level for
17 Collier ð1999Þ estimates such annual destruction costs of war for poor countries to be,
on average, about 2 percent of GDP.
18 Note that applying the methodology of Ai and Norton ð2003Þ, we have checked that
indeed the interaction term is negative for all probability ranges.
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Angola, Iraq, or LibyaÞ would have amass killings risk of 5.9 percent, that
is, almost double. Also, our other variables of interest have sizable ef-
fects: An increase in GDP per capita by US$10,000 would reduce the
mass killings risk by 0.7 percentage points, while moving from no change
in democracy scores during the last 5 years to democratization reforms
by 5 points ðon a 20-point scaleÞ in the last 5-year period increases the risk
of mass killings by 0.4 percentage points. Further, an increase of ethnic
polarization from 0 percent to 100 percent would increase the mass kill-
ings risk by 2.3 percentage points, and a population increase by 100 mil-
lion people decreases the mass killings risk by 0.2 percentage points.
B. Country-Level Evidence on the Effects of Mass Killings
One feature of our theory is that natural resource rents R are not af-
fected by mass killings, while the nonresource production decreases in
the aftermath ofmass killings by bM. Hence, after mass killings, the econ-
omy becomes relatively more resource dependent, with a larger share of
GDP being accounted for by natural resource production.
The assumption that R is not affected by mass killings is based on the
view that oil production is very capital intensive and requires very little
local labor; in many developing countries the whole resource extrac-
tion process is carried out by big multinational ﬁrms, and the state and
local population just receive taxes and royalties ðsee, e.g., the discussion
in Ploeg and Rohner ½2012Þ.
If our assumptions are valid, we should observe that in the aftermath
of mass killings, the amount and value of oil production are largely
unaffected, while the share of oil production in GDP should increase,
given that the nonresource sectors are harmed by the killings.
To assess this, we perform a very simple analysis, where we compare the
average values of various oil revenue measures in the 10 ðrespectively 5Þ
years before a mass killings ðMKÞ episode starts and compare them with
the averages of the same measures in the 10 ðrespectively 5Þ years after
the end of a mass killings episode. We include the same countries expe-
riencing mass killings and the same sample period as in the regression
analysis of the previous subsection.
Table 3 displays the results. We ﬁrst consider measures of resource
abundance in terms of weight and current market value. Consistent with
our model assumptions, the difference between the mean after mass
killings and the mean before mass killings is statistically not different
from zero ðif anything, it seems that the values of these variables increase
rather than decrease after mass killingsÞ. Then we look at three measures
of resource abundance relative to the GDP: gross national income ðGNIÞ,
namely, the oil production/GDP; the energy rents ðas a share of GNIÞ;
and the total natural resource depletion ðas a share of GNIÞ. In line with








































































































































































































































































































































































our assumptions, there is an increase in the average values of these var-
iables, given that the economy becomes more resource dependent ðin
ﬁve out of six comparisons the difference is statistically signiﬁcant, and
only for energy rents in a 10-year window the signiﬁcance threshold is
not quite reachedÞ.
One of the reasons why one could doubt our assumption of natural
resource production being unaffected by mass killings is that it may be
conceivable that in the aftermath of massacres countries suffer from ex-
port embargoes. While this may have been the case in a few exceptions,
it does not seem to be the rule. As shown for the last two variables in
the table, both fuel exports/GDP and trade/GDP if anything seem to
increase rather than decrease on average in the years following a mass
killings episode.
There is a general explanation for why sanctions may not be applied
once the killing is over: As established in the literature on economic sanc-
tions, sanctions are seen as coercive tools ði.e., meant to change the be-
havior of a targetÞ rather than punitive tools ði.e., meant to punish past
behavior; see, e.g., Pape 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2009Þ.
There are also important case studies that we can now mention in
support of the above ﬁndings. Consider, for example, the case of Su-
dan, a place with multiple mass killings in recent history.19 In the midst
of a civil war between the central government and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army in the South that had been raging since 1983, charac-
terized by large-scale killing of civilians, in 1999 Sudan started produc-
ing and exporting oil, which signiﬁcantly reduced Khartoum’s inter-
national isolation ðInternational Crisis Group 2002Þ. The opening of oil
ﬁelds pushed some European governments to adopt a friendlier atti-
tude toward Khartoum and brought about deeper economic ties with
China andMalaysia. In addition, Khartoum’s cooperation withUS counter-
terrorism efforts ðin particular after the September 11 attacksÞ determined
a substantial improvement of its relations with Washington. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, Khartoum resorted to scorched-earth tactics to dis-
place populations residing around existing and potential oil ﬁelds, thus
making these areas more defensible. The Sudan case thus illustrates how
it is not necessarily the case that large-scale victimization of civilians ðin
particular if it occurred in the pastÞwould prevent the perpetrating coun-
try from attracting investments by international energy companies.
Another important example is Iraq. As one can see from the oil data
we use from British Petroleum, Iraq’s oil production peaked in the 5 years
immediately after crushing the Kurdish rebels in 1975. Those years were
characterized by large-scale deportations of Kurds from border areas and
19 See, e.g., the discussion in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ð2000,
2004Þ.
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oil-rich Kirkuk.20 Oil production plummeted during the Iran-Iraq war
ðBaghdad could not export the bulk of its oil via the Basra portÞ but peaked
again at the end and after the war ð1988–89Þ, in spite of new mass killings
of Kurds in 1987–88.21
C. Ethnic Group–Level Evidence
While in subsection A we carried out an analysis at the country-year level,
here we focus on a panel at the ethnic group–year level. This allows us to
study what kinds of ethnic groups become victims of military massacres
of civilians.
As a starting point we use the Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups
ðGREGÞ data set ðWeidmann, Rod, and Cederman 2010Þ. Relying on
maps from the classical Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira from the 1960s, GREG
contains a geo-referenced data set with the coordinates of the group
boundaries of 929 ethnic groups. One major advantage of this very com-
prehensive data set is that it contains information on the geographical lo-
cation of groups, which enables us to merge it with other geo-referenced
group-level data using Geographical Information Systems ðGISÞ, while
this information on group boundaries is missing for the main competing
data sets on ethnic groups.22
One obvious limitation of this data set is that it is dated, which im-
plies that in some instances the group boundaries are not fully accu-
rate anymore in recent times, particularly because group boundaries can
change in the aftermath of civil wars. However, this has both advantages
and disadvantages. The fact that the data are dated lowers accuracy
and hence adds noise to our estimations, which biases the magnitude of
coefﬁcients and the signiﬁcance levels downward, while there seems to
be no other obvious bias of the results. This means that using GREG will
tend to bias the results against us, making them appear less strong than
they are in reality. The advantage of using group boundaries from the
1960s is that this limits concerns of reversed causality, as the massacres
we study take place three decades later. Thus, what we lose in terms of
accuracy we gain in terms of identiﬁcation.
As a dependent variable, we focus on a given ethnic group in a given
year being the target of military massacres of civilians. The only high-
quality measure of massacres of civilians at the ethnic group level we are
20 It is estimated that as many as 1,400 villages may have been destroyed after the war
between 1975 and 1978; see McDowall ð2004Þ.
21 A common opinion is that the international community was slow in accusing Iraq of
mass killings and turned a blind eye ðsee Hiltermann 2007Þ because it was a US/West ally.
Iraqi oil production was hit by sanctions only when Saddam Hussein became an interna-
tional villain by occupying Kuwait.
22 Throughout the database construction we use the country borders from the time-
varying, geo-referenced CShapes data set ðWeidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010Þ.
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aware of is from the Minorities at Risk ð2009 ½MARÞ project. MAR con-
tains a panel of all ethnic minority groups that suffer from threats or dis-
crimination. Note that 23 percent of all groups from GREG are included
in MAR, and 4.3 percent of the observations in MAR are coded as being
subject to military massacres of civilians. Our dependent variable of mass
killings victimization at the group level is available only for the years 1996–
2003, which leaves us with a short panel.
If we were to restrict our analysis to only groups included in MAR, our
results could suffer from sample selection as only groups at risk are in
MAR and all the fully peaceful and well-treated groups are excluded. Given
that MAR gives a comprehensive account of persecuted groups, it is safe to
assume that all groups who have been subject to massacres are included in
MAR. Hence it is reasonable to include the full sample of groups in GREG
in the analysis and code as having no massacres all groups absent from
MAR. This is what we do in table 4, where we have a sample of 7,098 ob-
servations ð1,582 observations when country ﬁxed effects are includedÞ. In
the online appendix we also perform additional regressions in which we
restrict the analysis to only groups in MAR, which results in a drop of
sample size to 1,299 observations but allows us to add additional control
variables that are available only in MAR.
Our main independent variable is the ethnic group’s petroleum abun-
dance, which is captured by the percentage of a group’s territory cov-
ered with oil and gas. To the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst ones
to construct this measure. Using GIS software ðArcGISÞ, we have matched
the data from GREG on the geographical boundaries of ethnic groups
with the geo-referenced petroleum data set ðPETRODATAÞ from Lujala,
Rod, and Thieme ð2007Þ, which tells us where oil ﬁelds lie. Combining this
information, we have computed a variable measuring which part of the
territory occupied by a given ethnic group contains oil. This yields a rela-
tively precise measure of how petrol rich the homelands of a given ethnic
group are. According to our theory, we expect groups that live in petrol-
rich areas, but are economically relatively unproductive, to be attractive
targets for the ruling groups in their country. By attacking such groups, the
group in power can substantially increase its share of natural resource rents
but only marginally decreases the production output.
Several other important independent variables are included in our
data set. Using the geo-referenced DIADATA data set on the location of
diamonds ðfrom Gilmore et al. 2005Þ, we have created a dummy variable
on whether a given ethnic group has diamond production on its terri-
tory.23 Further, we include several geographic and demographic control
23 There is such a huge variance in production scale among the different mining obser-
vations—and production quantities are not included in DIADATA—that it is safest to code
a dummy variable of production, which is also the approach chosen by Lujala, Gleditsch,
and Gilmore ð2005Þ.
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variables on the ethnic group level: the group’s relative population size
ðusing Cederman, Buhaug, and Rod 2009Þ, the group’s geographic con-
centration, the number of countries where the same ethnic group is pres-
ent ðboth computed with the help of the GREG dataÞ, the share of the
group’s territory covered by mountains, and the distance from the group
territory to its country’s capital ðboth from Cederman et al.’s studyÞ. In
addition, we have constructed variables capturing the group’s economic
potential: First, we have included the percentage of the group’s territory
with high-quality fertile soil, which has been constructed on the basis of the
Harmonized World Soil Database ðFischer et al. 2008Þ. Second, we have
included the average light intensity during the night in the ethnic group’s
territory, measured with the help of meteorologic satellites. These data are
TABLE 4









% of group’s territory with oil and gas 2.11** 3.90*
ð.91Þ ð2.13Þ
Group’s diamond production dummy 1.33* 2.25*
ð.75Þ ð1.26Þ
Group’s soil quality 3.68** 4.37***
ð1.61Þ ð1.43Þ
Group’s population/country population ðt 2 1Þ 24.51* 23.75*
ð2.38Þ ð2.13Þ
Group geographic concentration 21.46*** 23.83**
ð.53Þ ð1.50Þ
Group coethnics abroad .00 .62***
ð.17Þ ð.21Þ
Group’s share of mountainous terrain 1.84** 1.86*
ð.82Þ ð1.01Þ
Group’s distance to capital 2.52 21.03
ð.67Þ ð.69Þ
Group’s satellite light intensity .10 21.24
ð.48Þ ð1.98Þ
Group involved in civil conﬂict 2.63*** 3.88***
ð.82Þ ð.66Þ
Observations 7,098 1,582
Pseudo R2 .519 .637
Note.—The unit of observation is an ethnic group in a given year. The sample covers
all ethnic groups from the GREG list and the years 1996–2003. Column 1 has robust
standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses, while in col. 2 the estimator
used does not allow for clustering. All speciﬁcations include intercept, annual time dum-
mies, and all the country-level independent variables of ðthe most extensiveÞ col. 6 of the
online appendix table A1 ðnot reportedÞ.
* Signiﬁcant at p < .1.
** Signiﬁcant at p < .05
*** Signiﬁcant at p < .01
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from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and have
been used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity ðsee, e.g.,
Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti
2013Þ. Finally, we have included a dummy variable taking a value of one for
the groups that in the same year have been involved in civil conﬂict ðfrom
Cederman et al. 2009Þ. In Appendix B all variables are explained in detail.
In addition to these ethnic group–speciﬁc variables, we control for ex-
actly the same country-level variables as in the most inclusive speciﬁca-
tion of the country-level regressions ðcol. 6 of table A1 in the online ap-
pendixÞ.24 To account for unobserved heterogeneity, all columns have
robust standarderrors that are allowed tobe clustered at the country level.




PðMassacres civilianse ;y 5 1Þ














where the left-hand side is the logarithm of the ratio of the probability
of massacres of civilians over the probability of no massacres of civilians,
with the massacres of civilians variable varying at the ethnic ðeÞ and year
ðyÞ levels. Coefﬁcient a denotes the constant, U 0e ;y a vector of variables
that vary at the ethnic and year levels, V
0
e a vector of variables that vary at
the ethnic level, W
0
cy a vector of variables that vary at the country ðcÞ and
year levels, X
0
c a vector of variables that vary at the country level, and Z
0
y
a vector of annual time dummies; b, g, d, z, and h are vectors of coefﬁ-
cients. The coefﬁcients of interest are the ones corresponding to the
main ethnic group–level variables mentioned above.
As in the country-level regressions above, we code in table 4 the mil-
itary massacres of civilians as a dummy variable, taking a value of one if in
a given year a given ethnic group has been subject to massacres, and run
logit regressions.25 In column 1 it is found that groups that are more
petrol and diamond rich and that occupy valuable soils are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be targeted in terms of mass killings. This is in line with
the predictions of our model on resource abundance fueling the mass
killings risk.
24 The only exception is that we control for democratization in the last year rather than
democratization in the last 5 years. This helps to prevent a further drop in the sample size,
as in some of the columns of table 4 and of table A3 in the online appendix the sample size
is already critically small. Note, however, that when controlling for democratization over
the last 5-year period, we obtain very similar results, and our main variables of interest
ðpercentage of group’s territory with oil and gas, respectively, with oilÞ are statistically sig-
niﬁcant in all of the speciﬁcations.
25 In the online appendix we also present results when the dependent variable is con-
structed as an ordinal scale variable.
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Further, we ﬁnd that a given ethnic group is signiﬁcantly more at risk
if it is relatively small. This is also consistent with our theory: remember
that we control for the country-level variables of table 2, including ethnic
polarization.Hence, the fact that—for a given level of ethnic polarization—
smaller groups are more often targeted is consistent with the feature of our
model that smaller groups are more likely to be defeated in war.
In column 2 we include country ﬁxed effects, which implies that our
results are now entirely driven by variation between ethnic groups within
the same country and by variation over time. In this demanding speci-
ﬁcation as well, all results from the previous column are conﬁrmed and
all the previously signiﬁcant variables remain statistically signiﬁcant.
Let us brieﬂy discuss the quantitative importance of the effects of our
main variables, based on marginal effects for the logit regression of col-
umn 1. The baseline average risk for an ethnic group to be massacred is
1 percent in a given year, and an average group has 6.2 percent of its
territory covered by oil and gas wells. The marginal effect of a group
moving from zero oil to having oil ﬁelds under its whole territory would
be an increase of 1.7 percentage points in the risk of being subject to
massacres. Put differently, an ethnic group with all average characteristics
but no oil has a risk of being massacred of 0.9 percent, while the same
group would face a massacre risk of 2.6 percent if its whole territory was
covered with oil and gas, which corresponds to almost tripling the risk of
massacres. Further, having diamonds increases the risk of being the tar-
get ofmass killings by 1 percentage point.Moreover, a grouphaving high-
quality soil all over its land, rather than populating a completely deserted
spot, faces a 2.9 percentage point larger risk of being massacred. Finally,
increasing the group’s share of the country population by 10 percentage
points would reduce its risk of being massacred by 0.4 percentage points.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We have established that when a country divided into identiﬁable groups
is natural resource abundant and the destructive expected costs of civil
war are not overwhelmingly high, dynamic incentives to kill minority
groups emerge. Moreover, suchmaterial dynamic incentives to eliminate
opponents can also be enhanced when a democratization process or
some other source of increasing institutional constraints to unfair dis-
tributions arises, when the productivity of labor is low, and when the so-
ciety is ethnically polarized.
The empirical results conﬁrm the theoretical predictions. In contexts
displaying a large abundance of natural resources, and in particular pet-
rol and diamonds, the risk of mass killings is substantially larger. While
we do ﬁnd that the absolute amounts of natural resources matter, the
results also indicate that the relative weight of natural resources with re-
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spect to the nonresource production counts. Hence, for a given amount
of oil in the ground, the mass killings risk in a country can be substan-
tially reduced when a productive and skill-intensive economy is built.
The model could be easily extended in several interesting directions.
One particularly interesting extension that could be considered relates
to the description of economic activities: it is, for example, realistic to
allow for decreasing returns in agricultural production. In Rwanda, for
example, the really important contestable resource is productive land,
and decreasing returns from agricultural production could explain the
mass killings incentives.26 The predictions of such an extension would be
consistent with our empirical ﬁnding that ethnic groups with homelands
covered with very fertile land face a substantially larger risk of being
massacred. Another potentially fruitful extension could be to introduce
capital in the production function, to analyze the comparative incentives
of elites to destroy the asset holdings of powerless groups rather than
killing them.
The logic of our model could also be useful to capture the essential
motivations behind the mass killings of native American tribes: the Amer-
ican Indians were holding off the large-scale development and exploita-
tion of the great resources of the West, and their traditional use of the
land was considered much less efﬁcient than the alternative; hence the
elimination of them had a large impact both on the amount of natural
resources that it became possible to extract and on the average produc-
tivity. To capture this story fully in themodel, onewouldhave to attribute a
lower bi to the Indians and consider R as RðNiÞ, capturing the fact that
the amount of productive land and other resources exploitable by the
United States was considered decreasing in the size of Indian occupied
territories. Only when the Indians accepted ðor were forced to acceptÞ
the clear discrimination of reservations ðlow lÞ did the mass killings stop.
Finally, we believe that our insights about the potential drawbacks of
institutional constraints and direct threats of intervention could be use-
ful for future research on optimal intervention policies, a theoretical lit-
erature recently initiated by Kydd and Straus ð2013Þ.
26 Andre and Platteau ð1998Þ show that in the mass killings in Rwanda, Tutsis with large
landholdings faced a particularly high risk of being targeted by the Hutu death squads.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5
Express the value function for a given player k with population size Nk, and




½S 2 d 1 dViðNi ; Nj 2MÞ1 NjN dViðNi 2M ; NjÞ;
where
ViðNi ; Nj 2MÞ5 Ni
N 2M




dViðNi 2M ; Nj 2MÞ;
ðA1Þ
ViðNi 2M ; NjÞ5 Ni 2M
N 2M




dViðNi 2M ; NjÞ;
ðA2Þ
and
ViðNi 2M ; Nj 2MÞ5 Ni 2M
N 2 2M
S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
: ðA3Þ
Plugging ðA3Þ in equation ðA1Þ and solving it recursively, we obtain
ViðNi ; Nj 2MÞ
5
NiðS 2 bM 2 dÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ1 dðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ
ð12 dÞðN 2 2MÞðN 2M 2 dNiÞ
:
ðA4Þ
Similarly, plugging equation ðA3Þ in equation ðA2Þ and solving it recursively,
we obtain
ViðNi 2M ; NjÞ
5 ðNi 2MÞ ðS 2 bM 2 dÞðN 2 2M Þð12 dÞ1 dðNi 2M ÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞðN 2M 2 dNjÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ
:
ðA5Þ
Plugging these expressions into the payoff function for rebellion, the peace IC
condition for i becomes
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NiðS 2 dÞ
1 Nid
ðS 2 bM 2 dÞ½ð12 dÞNiðN 2 2MÞ1 dðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞ2 dðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞbM
ð12 dÞðN 2 2MÞðN 2M 2 dNiÞ











ðS 2 bM 2 dÞ½ð12 dÞNiðN 2 2MÞ1 dðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞ2 dðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞbM




ðS 2 bM 2 dÞ½ðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ1 dðNi 2MÞ2 dðNi 2MÞbM
ðN 2M 2 dNjÞðN 2 2MÞ
:
ðA6Þ
Note that yl*j =yR > 0, as in the unlimited mass killings power case.
This expression for l*j will later on be plugged into j ’s peace payoff function
½12 ðNi=N Þl*j S=ð12 dÞ. The payoff for j of deviating and performing mass kill-
ings is S 1 dVj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ, where
Vj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ5 Nj
N 2M







S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
:
Solving this recursively, we obtain
Vj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ
5
NjðS 2 bM 2 dÞð12 dÞðN 2 2MÞ1 dðNi 2MÞðNj 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ
ð12 dÞðN 2M 2 dNjÞðN 2 2MÞ
:
Our condition for j preferring peace to mass killings corresponds to
½12 ðNi=N Þl*j S
12 d
> S 1 dVj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ:
Plugging the expressions for l*j and Vj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ into the condition above
yields after reformulation condition ðA7Þ:
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ð12 dÞðN 2 2M ÞðN 2M 2 dNj ÞðN 2M 2 dNiÞ
1 dðN 2M 2 dNj ÞNiN ½ðbM 1 dÞð12 dÞNiðN 2 2MÞ
1 2ðbM 1 dÞdðNj 2MÞðNi 2MÞ
1 dðbM 1 dÞðN 2M 2 dNiÞ

ðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞNj
N
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1 dðNi 2M Þ
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ð12 dÞ2ðN 2 2M ÞNi
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Note that both the denominator and the numerator of the fraction are un-
ambiguously positive and that the condition for peace is unambiguously less
likely to hold for large R .
Note that it can be easily shown that for some parameters R*j > d holds ðin
which case the set ½d; R*j  is nonemptyÞ, hence making case i of the lemma
nonvacuous. For other parameter values, R*j ≤ d. In particular, when d is small
enough, we have R*j < d ðe.g., when d5 0, then R *j ; d 2 bN < dÞ, while for large
enough d, the inequality R*j > d holds ðe.g., in the limit when d → 1, then R*j
tends toward inﬁnityÞ.
For small enough values of l ðless than l*j Þ, the above computations of the
two thresholds l*j and R*j are all we need for the characterization of the region
of peace.
Let us now consider the case in which l binds. We know that i will be peace-










The payoff for j of mass killings is S 1 dVj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ, where
Vj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ5 Nj
N 2M







S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
:
Solving this expression recursively and simplifying it yields
Vj ðNi 2M ; NjÞ
5
NjðS 2 bM 2 dÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ1 dðNi 2MÞðNj 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ
ðN 2M 2 dNjÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ
:
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NjðS 2 bM 2 dÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ1 dðNi 2MÞðNj 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ
ðN 2M 2 dNjÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ
:
After reformulation this condition becomes






NjðS 2 bM 2 dÞðN 2 2MÞð12 dÞ1 dðNi 2MÞðNj 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ




Note that the peace condition is harder to satisfy when l increases. Notice also
that the right-hand side is unambiguously decreasing in R , meaning that peace is
achievable only when R is small enough.
The construction of the third threshold function L*j ðRÞ obtained above
completes the proof of part i.
Part ii: Consider now what happens when R > R*j and/or l >maxfl*j ; L*j g,
where R*j is deﬁned in expression ðA7Þ, l*j in expression ðA6Þ, and L*j in ex-
pression ðA8Þ. The best SPE deﬁnitely involves war in the ﬁrst period because of
the shadow of mass killings by j. If group j wins, it commits mass killingsM . If
group i wins, it commits mass killingsM iff R > R*i and/or l >maxfl*i ; L*i g, while
for R ≤ R*i and l ≤maxfl*i ; L*i g, the best SPE involves peace ever after. Consider
now the case in which mass killings were perpetrated by the winner. Call h 5 i, j
the winning group, and let us ﬁnd the condition under which group h, after
killingM members of group k, is able to buy peace forever after. Compute l^h







Group k knows that if it rebels it will trigger a phase with war in every future pe-
riod, where group h cannot do any more mass killings in any period, as h has al-
ready reached its upper boundM , and where at the ﬁrst occasion when k reaches
power it will commit mass killings ofM . Hence, the payoff for k from rebellion is
WkðNk 2M ; NhÞ5 Nk 2M
N 2M

S 2 bM 2 d 1 d
Nk 2M
N 2 2M






dWkðNk 2M ; NhÞ:
Solving this recursively and reformulating it yields
WkðNk 2M ; NhÞ5 ðNk 2MÞ
S 2 bM 2 d 1 d
Nk 2M
N 2 2M
S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
N 2M 2 dNh
:
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Making equal the peace and rebellion payoffs pins down the indifference l^h :
l^h 5 ðN 2MÞ ðN 2 2MÞðS 2 bM 2 dÞð12 dÞ1 dðNk 2MÞðS 2 2bM 2 dÞðN 2 2MÞðN 2M 2 dNhÞðS 2 bMÞ
:
The ﬁnal step is to compute the condition under which h is willing indeed to offer









A deviation to exploitation yields to h S 2 bM 1 dWhðNk 2M ; NhÞ, where
WhðNk 2M ; NhÞ5 Nh
N 2M







S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
;
which becomes, after reformulation,
WhðNk 2M ; NhÞ5
NhðS 2 bM 2 dÞ1 ðNk 2MÞd Nh 2M
N 2 2M
S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
N 2M 2 dNh
:
Putting these expressions together, we ﬁnd after reformulation that peace is sus-
tainable iff
R < R**h ; ðbMðNk 2MÞfðNh 2MÞ½12 2dð12 dÞ1 ðNk 2MÞg
1 dfðNk 2MÞ½ðN 2 2MÞ1Mdð12 dÞ1 dð12 dÞNhðNh 2MÞgÞ
fð12 dÞðNk 2MÞ½ðN 2 2MÞ2 dðNh 2MÞg2 bN :
Note that one can easily show that there are parameter values for which the
interval ½R*h ; R**h  is not empty: for example, for the special case of d 5 0 we have
R*j ; d 2 bN < R**h ; d 1 bM 2 bN :
.
Now we can also derive the analogous conditions when l is binding. In par-








> S 2 bM 1 d
NhðS 2 bM 2 dÞ1 ðNk 2MÞd Nh 2M
N 2 2M
S 2 2bM 2 d
12 d
N 2M 2 dNh
;
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which becomes




NhðS 2 bM 2 dÞð12 dÞ1 ðNk 2MÞd Nh 2M
N 2 2M
ðS 2 2bM 2 dÞ





Proof of Proposition 2
Part I: The effects of R on the probability of mass killings are obvious, since mass
killings are surely avoided only if R < R*j , deﬁned in ðA7Þ.
For performing comparative statics with respect to d and b, we can reformu-
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The right-hand side is unambiguously increasing in d, which implies that peace
withoutmass killings is easier to achieve when the destruction costs of war are larger.
The effect of an increase in b is a priori ambiguous, as b multiplies a ﬁrst,
positive and a second, negative term. For high enough d the ﬁrst term is always
larger than the second ði.e., in the limit when d→ 1, the ﬁrst term tends toward
inﬁnityÞ, in which case larger b makes peace easier to sustain, as in the uncon-
strained power case.
Further, the condition for peace is more likely to hold for very patient than for
very impatient groups. Given that the condition above contains termswith higher-
order polynomials of d, we cannot express an analytical threshold in terms of d.
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However, we can study the limit cases. In particular, in the limit when d→ 1, the
right-hand side goes toward inﬁnity, and the peace condition always holds. In
contrast, when d 5 0, the peace condition simpliﬁes to R < R*j ; d 2 bN , which
never holds, as long as d < S.
Note that in the limit of d→ 1, the right-hand side is also increasing in N and
decreasing in Ni/N.
Part II: This is the case, as both l < L*h and l < L**h are more likely to hold for
small l.
Part III: In the limit when d → 1, threshold R*j ðand hence the likelihood of
peaceÞ is a concave function ofM and the peace likelihood is at maximum for
M 5 ðbN 2 dÞ=4b.
Appendix B
Data Description
This appendix describes the data used in Section VI. Descriptive summary sta-
tistics for all variables are provided in the online appendix.
Variables on the Country Level
Chief executive is military ofﬁcer: Dummy variable taking a value of one if the chief
executive has an ofﬁcer rank. From Beck et al. ð2001Þ, updated version 2007.
Civil war incidence:Dummy taking a value of one when there is a civil war taking
place. From Gleditsch and Ward’s ExpandedWar Data ðhttp://privatewww.essex
.ac.uk/126ksg/expwar.htmlÞ.
Democracy: Polity scores ranging from210 ðstrongly autocraticÞ to110 ðstrongly
democraticÞ. From Polity IV Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions data
ðhttp://www.systemicpeace.org/polity4Þ.
Democratization (over last 5 years): ðAbsoluteÞ change in the democracy scores
between t 2 1 and t 2 5 ðsee aboveÞ.
Energy rents: Rents from energy depletion in percent of GNI at market prices.
Energy depletion covers crude oil, natural gas, and coal ðhard and ligniteÞ. Rent5
ðProduction VolumeÞ  ðInternational Market Price 2 Average Unit Production
CostÞ. From World Bank Adjusted Net Savings database ðhttp://go.worldbank
.org/3AWKN2ZOY0Þ.
Ethnic polarization: Continuous measure going from zero ðminimumÞ to one
ðmaximumÞ. From Reynol-Querol Data on Ethnic Polarization and Fractional-
ization ðhttp://www.econ.upf.edu/126reynal/data_web.htmÞ.
Fuel exports/GDP: Fuel exports per GDP. The 12 observations ð5 0.24 percent
of the sampleÞ with values above one have been set to one. From World Bank
World Development Indicators ðhttp://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40Þ.
GDP per capita: In US$1,000, at constant US dollars ðyear 2000Þ. From World
Bank World Development Indicators.
Mass killings: Dummy variable taking a value of one when mass killings are
reported. FromPolitical Instability Task ForceGenocides data ðhttp://globalpolicy
.gmu.edu/pitf/Þ. In the online appendix, we also make use of the mass killings in-
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tensity information contained in this data set, which distinguishes 11 different in-
tensity levels ranging in steps of 0.5 from 0 to 5.
Mountainous terrain: Percentage of territory covered by mountains. From
Collier et al. ð2009Þ.
Oil production(/GDP): Total value of current oil production ð/GDPÞ. Produc-
tion quantities and prices from British Petroleum Statistical Review of World
Energy June 2009 dataset ðhttp://www.bp.com/statisticalreviewÞ. GDP in cur-
rent prices from World Bank World Development Indicators.
Population: In 10 million people. From World Bank World Development In-
dicators.
Population density: From World Bank World Development Indicators.
Total resource depletion: Total rents from energy1mineral1 forest depletion in
percent of GNI at market prices. Rent 5 ðProduction VolumeÞ  ðInternational
Market Price 2 Average Unit Production CostÞ. From World Bank Adjusted Net
Savings database.
Trade over GDP: Total value of trade divided by total GDP. From World Bank
World Development Indicators.
Variables on the Ethnic Group Level
Group coethnics abroad: Number of countries in which the same ethnic group also
exists. Computed with GIS on the basis of the group boundaries from the GREG
data set ðWeidmann, Rod, and Cederman 2010Þ.
Group geographic concentration: Corresponds to the ratio of the area where a
given ethnic group in a given country is the largest group divided by the total
area where the group is present in this same country. Computed with GIS on the
basis of the group boundaries from the GREG data set ðWeidmann, Rod, and
Cederman 2010Þ.
Group involved in civil conﬂict: Variable “Incidence” from Cederman et al.
ð2009Þ.
Group’s diamond production dummy: Constructed with GIS on the basis of the
group boundaries from the GREG data set ðWeidmann, Rod, and Cederman
2010Þ and the geo-referenced DIADATA data set on the location of diamonds
ðfrom Gilmore et al. 2005Þ.
Group’s distance to capital: In 1,000 kilometers. From Cederman et al. ð2009Þ.
Group’s population/country population: Group population from Cederman et al.
ð2009Þ; country population from World Bank World Development Indicators.
Group’s satellite light intensity: Average light intensity during the night in the
ethnic group’s territory, measured with the help of meteorologic satellites. Re-
scaled, such that values range from zero to 6.3. These data are from the National
Oceanic andAtmosphericAdministration ðNighttimeLightsTimeSeries ½http://
www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/downloadV4composites.htmlfAXPÞ. Data on aver-
age visible, stable lights, and cloud-free coverages. In particular, we use their
“cleaned” and “ﬁltered” version of the data, which “contains the lights from cit-
ies, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting, including gas ﬂares. Ephemeral
events, such as ﬁres have been discarded. Then the background noise was iden-
tiﬁed and replaced with values of zero.”
Group’s share of mountainous terrain: From Cederman et al. ð2009Þ.
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Group’s soil quality: Part of the group’s territory with high-quality fertile soil.
Constructed on the basis of the Harmonized World Soil Database ðFischer et al.
2008Þ. Their complete global grid of nutrient availability is ranked from 1 ð“no or
slight constraints”Þ to 4 ð“very severe constraints”Þ and also including categories
5 ð“mainly nonsoil”Þ, 6 ð“permafrost area”Þ, and 7 ð“water bodies”Þ. Our dummy
takes a value of one for categories 1 and 2, categories 3–6 get value 0, and category
7 is set to missing.
Mass killings: Military massacres of suspected rebel supporters ðon the group
levelÞ. From Minorities at Risk data ðhttp://www.cidcm.umd.edu/marÞ, variable
Rep22. Coded as a dummy, taking a value of one when Rep22 equals one or
more. Coded as zero for all groups that are not classiﬁed as Minorities at Risk.
Percentage of group territory covered with oil and gas: Constructed with GIS on the
basis of the group boundaries from the GREG data set ðWeidmann, Rod, and
Cederman, 2010Þ and the location of oil and gas ﬁelds from the geo-referenced
petroleum data set ðPETRODATAÞ from Lujala et al. ð2007Þ.
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